bribery and the criminal justice system
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In previous sessions we have looked at types of crime (rape
and organised crime) for which it was taken for granted that the
criminal law should be enforced but where pressures have led, rightly
or
wrongly, to changes to the criminal law and
criminal procedure which have the aim of bringing various types of
'powerful offenders' to justice. The cases we looked at so far are
those of rape and organised crime. In
the next three sessions we are going to add another
dimension: the fact that forms of behaviour which are criminalised can
also be viewed from other perspectives which either deny or put into
the background their criminality in favour of other aspects of the
situation in which they occur. This week we shall look at a recent
example from the UK in which what seemed to be criminal activity was
allowed to continue because it was seen, by the British government, as
vital to national security. The activity itself (either deserving
of criminal prosecution or vital to national security, depending how
you view it) was conducted by a very powerful organisation - a leading
commercial corporation So we also add to our list of 'powerful offenders' capable of
putting up considerable obstacles to the criminal justice system, the
commercial enterprise, in particular large enterprises with a global
reach and who play a key part in the national economy. First, we need to familiarise ourselves with the main features of what is known as corporate crime.
The study of corporate or business crime is a fairly specialised area
of criminology because it may require familiarity with aspects of
economics and finance, business law and accountancy. Nevertheless
we can quite easily summarise the main forms of corporate crime A quick introduction to corporate crime
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competitors |
stealing customers from your competitors by bribery or other 'dirty tricks' |
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the state |
evading taxes, making false claims for subsidies, over-pricing of contracts |
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investors |
siphoning off investors money for personal use, insider trading, share support operations |
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employees |
Health and safety violations, diversion of pension funds for other company use |
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customers |
price fixing, faulty or counterfeit products, falsification of test results (e.g. on pharmaceutical products) |
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the environment |
pollution, dumping of toxic waste products |
Obviously the table above is rather like the chapter headings for a
large textbook on corporate crime. We can note that the obstacles
to the criminalisation of many corporate offenders are twofold. Firstly,
some of the criminal offences are very difficult to detect and gather
evidence about. The evidence of tax evasion or the over-pricing of
contracts may lie deep in the financial accounts and bank statements of
a large corporation. It may require the combined evidence of specialist
police officers, forensic accountants and commercial lawyers to gather
sufficient evidence to mount a criminal prosecution with a chance of
proving beyond reasonable doubt the criminality of the offender. In the
UK large commercial frauds are handled by a specialist investigatory
body known as the Serious Fraud Office which has access to this type of expertise. In the US such investigations are conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission
Governments in the UK have argued for decades about how to strengthen
the criminal justice system to deal with such offences. A major
emphasis has been the attempt to dispense with the jury system on the
grounds that 'ordinary people' on juries cannot understand many of the
complexities of corporate finance. The argument in favour of retention
of the jury has been that at the end of the day what the prosecution
has to prove beyond reasonable doubt is that someone acted illegally.
Having to convince a jury of ordinary people is a good check on a
sloppy prosecution case! A judge sitting alone without a jury may
become 'battle weary' having hear similar arguments so many times
before and thus be insufficiently critical of the prosecution case
A second resource
at the disposal of large corporations is often their ability to reframe
the incident away from any notion of 'crime' towards alternative ways
of looking at what happened such as 'accident'. Thus one of the
largest environmental crimes of the twentieth century remains
undoubtedly the leaking of poisonous gas from a faulty storage
container at the Union Carbide chemical plant in Bhopal India
in 1984. The initial response of the Indian government was to charge
the US head of Union Carbide (an American corporation) with criminal
negligence and manslaughter. He was rapidly released. The company
meanwhile used its considerable leaverage in the media to 'redefine'
what had happened as a 'disaster' and 'terrible accident' and use other
diversionary tactics such as suspecting 'sabotage' by various Indian
radical groups
Finally, and this will
be our main example, below the activity undertaken by the corporation
might be considered by another very powerful organisation - the state -
as of sufficient national importance (e.g. "vital to our national
security interests") that it is considered legitimate to overlook its
criminal aspects.
But, before moving on to our main example, there is one other
element we need to consider, Namely the fact that not all crimes are of
the same status.
This issue might be summed up in the phrase "there are
crimes and then there are crimes" That is to say not all acts which
violate the criminal law necessarily carry the same connotations of
evil and wrong doing. Students of the English and similar systems of jurisprudence and criminal law will
be familiar with the distinction between mala in se and mala prohibita. These Latin terms may be roughly translated as 'wrong in itself' and 'wrong because prohibited'. Thus mala in se
refers to crimes such as murder or theft which are considered wrong in
themselves. The reason they are against the criminal law is because
they are morally evil. A criminal law which failed to criminalise such
acts would be incoherent and itself degenerate. Mala prohibita, by contrast, refers to acts which are wrong simply because they violate
the criminal law. Exceeding the speed limit on a motorway is an
example. You can be pulled up by the traffic police and issued with a
speeding ticket or prosecuted in a criminal court. The judge will no
doubt tell you that driving at such a speed is dangerous not just to
yourself but to others around you. But you have not actually harmed
anyone. It is the speed violation which is the crime. Parliament passed
this law for good reason, to reduce accidents on motorways. But some
libertarians - who own fast cars - might argue you should be able to
drive at what speed you like. Fast driving is not obviously
wrong as such in the way that murder is. Another example might be
smoking or dealing in cannabis. This is against the criminal law and a
great deal of police time and resources are devoted to tracking down
and arresting the dealers of cannabis and other illegal drugs. But
again, libertarians may argue that the state has no business
interfering with your right to take drugs. Others might argue the whole
issue should be a matter of health policy rather than criminal justice.
Most of you will be familiar with these arguments.
Now when we get into the area of business crime - crimes
committed by members of commercial corporations acting in their
capacities then we - come into a field in which there are many forms of
mala prohibita. They
include Health and Safety laws, environmental protection laws against
dumping toxic waste products in the environment in excess of government
degreed norms. In finance and banking, for example, there is a criminal offence known as Insider Trading. It involves the use of priviledged access to
knowledge about company performance, before it is known to the general
investing public, to sell or buy shares before their price changes to reflect that
knowledge.
This practice only became a crime in 1980 before which it was not a
crime at all and access to inside information was simply one of the
'perks' that went with a job in key City of London financial
institutions. It was made a criminal offence because it was felt that
with the expansion of financial dealing actions taken on the basis of
such inside information may have a distorting effect on the working of
the market in stocks and shares. In other words Insider Trading is a
regulatory offence: it is criminalised in order to minimise its
occurrence rather than any notion that it is wrong in the sense that
theft or fraud are wrong
Another example concerns the bribery of (or paying of
'commissions' to) customers by a company in order to secure the sale of
its products. It might be thought that this is not intrinsically
criminal. If paying 'under the counter' helps to increase sales why
should it be a crime? The government may decide to pass
legislation prohibiting such activities as insider trading or paying
commissions not because they are somehow intrinsically wrong but
because they impede the smooth functioning of business and markets. In
this case the criminal law and criminal justice system is being used as
a form of regulation in the interests of efficiency rather than morality as would be the case with murder or theft. That is why the former are sometimes known as regulatory offences.
Finally, after this extended introduction, we can move to our
main example: bribery. The example we shall focus on is the alleged
paying of bribes to Saudi Arabian officials by a major British
armaments company, British Aerospace Systems (BAE Systems) to secure a
contract for aircraft sales and the circumstances in which the
government allegedly pressured a criminal investigation to stop because
it was contrary to the interests of national security. The main reading
for this is Tim Webb's pamplet 'Bribing for Britain'
Before going any further it should be made absolutely clear that
British Aerospace systems has from the outset denied any wrongdoing in
the matter. BAE is, incidently, the fourth largest
arms producer in the world and Britain's only arms manufacturer.
Some types of businesses are more exposed to the temptation
to pay bribes than others. Where the marketing of a product depends
upon government approval and licensing, as with medical drugs then
there may be some unscrupulous companies which may attempt to bribe
government scientists to falsify or ignore negative results in the
testing laboritories. John Braithwaite in his, still famous, study
Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutic Industry, found many examples
regarding the drug Thalidomide which was eventually marketed with such
disastrous results
There are other industries where the nature of the produce or
service being sold dictates that either a large number of products will
be sold or none at all. The aircraft industry is one such example. No
airline wants a fleet of about six or seven different types of aircraft
- a few Boeing 747s here, a few Airbuses there etc. Spares would have
to be kept for different aircraft, separate training for
mechanics and pilots working with the different aircraft
would have to be maintained. All this would increase
costs. Far better to decide between the competing aircraft
manufacturers and equip your whole fleet with one type. Then you
are carrying one system of spares, maintenance, pilot and mechanic
training. So from the standpoint of the competiting aircraft
manufacturers, keeping customers 'sweet' so that when the time to renew
their fleet of aircraft comes, they buy a fleet of yours and not those
of you competitors.
Not surprising therefore that we find some examples of bribing
customers in this area. From a strictly economic standpoint the paying
of a bribe simply lowers the price at which the product is sold. But
the bribe is more than a price reduction, it is more like a personal
payment to members of the purchasing company. It may take the form of
products for their personal use - a paid holiday for example. In the
commercial aircraft industry one of the most famous bribe scandals goes
back to the period 1970-75 when allegedly the Lockheed Aircraft
Corporation. paid $22 million to foreign governments, officials and
political parties to secure sales contracts. Among those allegedly on
the payroll were the then Japanese prime minister, the Dutch Royal
Family and various Italian politicians. Further revelations in 1976
showed that many of Lockheeds competitors had been doing the same
thing.
In the field of military equipment, including aircraft, similar
considerations apply. No government wants its armed forces to have a
variety of different tanks, aircraft, missiles, rifles etc. each with
their own specific munitions, training and maintenance requirements.
Governments will normally decide between the competition and then go
for one, or at least a very few, suppliers for specific types of
armament.
Tim Webb notes two other factors in the course of his discussion:
In the UK armaments industry cost overheads are high due to relatively short production runs and thus the need recoup costs by selling as much as possible overseas.
Many of the products of the UK arms industry face declining markets. The aircraft in question here, the Typhoon Eurofighter was designed for an epoch when the main potential enemy was high flying Soviet bombers. That threat has long since passed. A cursory glance at the major armed conflicts around the world today - the Congo, Afghanistan - will show that the emphasis is on ground troops, infantry weapons, light armoured vehicles. The enemies being fought do not have high flying bombers but are for the main part poorly equipped but highly skilful irregular or guerillas volunteers. Who needs the Eurofighter in such circumstances? And if any potential customers present themselves the temptation to pay bribes to keep them 'on board' is considerable
The next interesting thing that Tim Webb shows is that from the mid
1960s onwards British governments accepted the normality of bribing
customers as part of the arms export drive. Webb quotes an internal
document from 1999 from the British government's Defence Export Services Organisation (DESO) . The document said "In certain parts of the
world it has become commonplace for special commissions to be paid.
This is a matter for DESO, to whom all requests for special commissions
should be referred." Special commissions' is of course a polite word for bribes.
It is crucial to understand that at this time bribery of foreign
officials (such as officials in the Defence Ministry of a potential
purchaser government) may have been frowned upon but it was not a
criminal offence, unlike bribery of domestic government officials,
until very recently -2001 to be precise. We are dealing, in other
words, with a regulatory offence of the type we have already discussed.
In the US and many other countries such bribery is a criminal offence
and the US and other countries were putting pressure on the UK
government to criminalise such activity. It was brought into UK law as
part of anti-terrorist legislation. The 2001 Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act,
section 12 extended the traditional crime of bribery of public
officials to
include individuals where "functions of the person who receives or is
offered a reward have no connection with the United Kingdom and are
carried out in a country or territory outside the United Kingdom".
Meanwhile the Saudi Arabian connection had become very
important for the British armaments industry since the 1960s and Tim
Webb gives an account of the continually close relations between the
ruling Saudi royal family and the British government. Our case
study begins in 2005 when the Saudis agreed, for whatever reason, to buy 72 Eurofighter Typhoon
aircraft (of which BAE is the
British manufacturer) under conditions in which other countries were
considering cancelling
contracts, usually for the reasons we have mentioned above. BAE would
of course be the main British beneficiary from this contract. It was
conjectured that the paying of commissions may have been important in
securing this contract because there was no obvious military reason why
the Saudis needed a fleet of these aircraft. (see the article by Campaign Against Arms Trade)
As we have mentioned, the paying of bribes or commissions became a
criminal offence in 2001. The Serious Fraud Office (SFO) which we have
already mentioned, began to get interested in the BAE-Saudi
relationship. There was, by the mid - 2000s allegedly evidence of
permanent 'slush fund' from which various payments could be made to
Saudi officials. The main ways of transmitting funds, it was alleged,
besides direct payment from this fund to the Swiss bank account of a
Saudi intermediary also included:
various types of 'offset arrangements' such as for example a Saudi
company providing infrastructure services to a British run facility in
Saudi Arabia would over-charge for its services and pocket the
difference
barter arrangements: arms for oil. Some of the armaments were exchanged directly for Saudi oil (rather than money) but some of the oil included in the deal would not actually be delivered but rather sold off by the Saudi officials who then pocket the money
alongside this, there were, it was alleged, all sorts
of hospitality arrangements provided in the UK free to Saudi visiting
officials, pilots on training courses for the new aircraft etc.
By 2004 the SFO investigation was gathering pace and by 2005
the investigators were making requests to the Swiss banks which
allegedly held accounts through which the bribery payments were
allegedly passing
A leading Saudi prince (Prince Bandhar) who was concerned
with the aircraft contract got wind of what was happening and called in
the British Ambassador to request that the investigation be halted. The
head of the SFO, Robert Wardle at first resisted pressure from the
Prime Minister (Tony Blair), the Attornery General (Lord Goldsmith) and
allegedly BAE itself
In September 2006 the SFO obtained the consent of the relevant Swiss banks to view the accounts of the agent of Prince Bandhar
On the 14th December 2006 the inquiry was dropped just as Swiss banks were about to wire the documents to the SFO.
Robert Wardle, the head of the SFO claimed that calling off the investigation was his decision. It was said that he called it off because it wasn't making sufficient progress. But this seems unlikely perhaps in view of the fact that the SFO was about the recieve important documents. Meanwhile both the Prime Minister and the Attorney General made public comments which could be construed as suggesting that they had been instrumental in pressuring Wardle to discontinue the investigation. The Attorney General, Lord Goldsmith said: "It has been necessary to balance the rule of law against the wider public interest." While Tony Blair said "Our relationship with Saudi Arabia is vitally important for our country... that strategic interest comes first"
What
was meant by 'the wider public interest' and how could it conceivably
clash with the principle of the rule of law which is fundamental to our
criminal justice system? Blair referred to 'national security' It
was then said that Saudi Arabia was a vital source of information to
the British Security Services about terrorist activity directed at the
UK and that the Saudis might end this if the SFO investigation
continued. There seemed to be a shortage of facts to support this
position and one response was that in any case the Saudis were equally
dependent on information given to them by the UK government regarding
the activities of Saudi dissidents based in the UK.
Meanwhile the US and numerous other countries were furious
with the UK decision. The decision did not go unchallenged in the
courts. The pressure group Campaign Against Arms Trade took
the matter to the High Court which in April 2008 ruled that the
Director of the SFO had acted unlawfully in stopping the investigation.
The court noted:
"No-one,
whether within this country or outside, is entitled to interfere with
the course of our justice. It is the failure of Government and the
defendant [the Director of the Serious Fraud Office] to bear that
essential principle in mind that justifies the intervention of this
court."
However in july 2008 this was overturned by the House of Lords (the highest appeal court in the UK) on the grounds that the Director of the SFO had a right to make such a decision
Meanwhile BAE itself had set up a committee in 2007 under
former Lord Chief Justice Lord Woolf, to review its ethical business
practices. You can read the report here
Nor has the SFO given up. BAE sells arms around the world and
a number of SFO investigations with regard to bribery are under way
including
Tanzania: In 2001 This relatively poor African state was persuaded to buy an expensive military air traffic control system (cost £28 million) that they didn't need, given the relative size of the Tanzanian air force. It is alleged that Prime Minister Tony Blair championed the sale against opposition from other Cabinet members such as Clair Short MP. It was later alleged that BAE had paid commissions amounting to about 29% of contract price.
South Africa: In December 2008 evidence emerged suggesting that BAE paid £100million to
'financially incentivise' various South African purchasing officials with regard to the purchase of BAE Hawk and Gripen aircraft to the tune of £1.5bn
In March 2009 Count Alfons Mensdorff-Pouilly, who acted as an agent for BAE (i.e. he ran
various intermediary companies) was arrested in Austria in connection with
bribery in relation to Hungarian and Czech military aircraft sales
The overwhelmingly central issue is the right of the
government to stop a major criminal investigation and thereby undermine
the rule of law. The doctrine of the rule of law is central to modern
conceptions of legality in an open, democratic society. It
implies, among other things, that the law will be enforced impartially,
against any person or institution that violates it. In the 17th
and 18th centuries a key issue was to stop the King intervening in the
legal system by stopping the prosecution of people who were his friends
or under his patronage. Even the King must be subject to the law. Now
in 2008 the issue seems to have reared its head again.
The only defence I can think of, and I have not heard this
from any other source, is that while it would of course be unthinkable
for a government to try and stop a murder prosecution, it is not so
disastrous with regard to a law (outlawing bribery of foreign
officials) that is very much mala prohibita
and only a crime in a 'technical sense' and only enacted in 2001. To
this the reply would of course be that law is law and once we allow
laws to be non-enforced just because they are to some extent
'technicalities' then we open the floodgates to increasing outside
interference with our rights and liberties.